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THE HOBBS LEVIATHAN: THE DANGEROUS
BREADTH OF THE HOBBS ACT AND
OTHER CORRUPTION STATUTES
John S. Gawey*
"[T]he more corrupt the State, the greater the number of its
laws."'
BACKGROUND
On March 2, 1942 the Supreme Court infamously upheld the Sec-
ond Circuit's reversals of extortion convictions for the Local 807
branch of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in United States
v. Local 807 International Brotherhood of Teamsters.2 For years, Local 807
routinely stopped out-of-state non-union trucks carrying large quanti-
ties of merchandise as they entered New York City and demanded,
sometimes violently,3 that the drivers pay regular union-fees and per-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.A., Letters,
University of Oklahoma, 2009. Many thanks to Professor G. Robert Blakey for his
advice and encouragement during the planning stages of this Note, the staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their work during the editing process, and finally to my
parents Dr. and Mrs. Stephen J. Gawey for their love and support. Any errors are my
own.
1 PUBLIUS CORNLIUS TACITUS, THE ANNALS OF TACITUS BOOKS 1-VI: AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION 212 (George Gilbert Ramsay trans., 1904). Tacitus wrote that after the
Decemviri drew up the Twelve Tables in 452 B.C., Roman legislation up to Caesar
Augustus displayed troubling signs of class dissension that led to the "ruin of individu-
als." Id. at 211-12.
2 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
3 Violence even surrounded the trial. Several days before, a key government
witness was murdered while driving on the West Side Highway in New York City. The
witness, Charles A. Brown, was an employee of Local 807 who placed union-men on
the non-union trucks entering New York. See Union Aide Slain on Express Drive, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1940, at 3; FBI Joins Inquiry into Killing Here, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1940,
at 23.
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mit union-members to drive and unload the trucks.4 In affirming the
reversals, the Court focused on an exception in the Anti-Racketeering
Act of 1934.5 That Act prohibited:
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any
way or in any degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or
commodity moving or about to move in trade or commerce-
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to
use or threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of
money or other valuable considerations, or the purchase or
rental of property or protective services, not including, however,
the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee,
or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced
by wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official
right .... 6
Reasoning that Congress intended to exempt militant labor-activ-
ity from the statute's reach, the Court held that an "outsider who
'attempts' unsuccessfully by violent means to achieve the status of an
employee and to secure wages for services falls within the exception."7
Local 807 set the stage for the enactment of the Hobbs Act, the
federal government's comprehensive extortion statute. The case was
the first high-profile prosecution under the 1934 Act, and it failed.8
Congress reacted promptly. In April of 1943 the House passed an
amendment to the Anti-Racketeering Act, but the measure died in the
Senate.9 Undeterred, the House passed another bill in 1945. Repre-
sentative Hancock of New York stated that the bill's purpose was to
counteract the Supreme Court's decision in Local 807, because the
ruling "legaliz [ed] in certain labor disputes the use of robbery and
extortion."10 Representative Eberharter of Pennsylvania asked the
bill's proponents if the amendment would change the federal defini-
tion of extortion. 1 The bill's opponents worried that without a spe-
cial exception for militant labor-activity,12 the definition of extortion
in the amendment was "so broad as to permit one to drive a coach
4 Local 807, 315 U.S. at 526.
5 Pub. L. No. 376, 48 Stat. 979.
6 Id. at 979-80 (emphasis added).
7 Local 807, 315 U.S. at 531.
8 See Racket Conviction of Union Is Upset, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1941, at 36 (chroni-
cling the overturning of the conviction by the Second Circuit).
9 See 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Clarence Hancock).
10 Id.
11 Id. (statement of Rep. Herman Eberharter).
12 See id. at 11,901 (statement by Rep. Emanuel Celler).
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and six through" it.13 In reality, Congress adopted essentially the
same extortion definition as the one contained in section (b) of the
1934 Act. Yet looking back nearly sixty-five years, trepidations about
the statute's breadth have proven remarkably prescient, albeit not in
the context of organized labor. The amended version of the federal
anti-racketeering law, the Hobbs Act, prohibits interference with inter-
state commerce by robbery or extortion. 14 The Act defines extortion
as:
[T]he obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.'5
Violators face up to twenty years of imprisonment. The problems
of breadth did not arise from extortion by force, violence, or fear, but
instead from the clause that was an afterthought. Under its current
reading, extortion "under color of official right" affords prosecutors a
wide range of discretion. Danger exists in this discretion. In broad
terms, when Congress targets criminal activity-whether it is a corrupt
labor union or a dirty politician-it often creates over-inclusive and
overlapping statutes.' 6 For instance, an extortion victim could also be
punished for bribery.' 7 Official right extortion' also threatens to
13 Id.
14 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2006).
15 Id. (emphasis added). The Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 proscribed:
"Obtain [ing] the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
force or fear, or under color of official right. . . ." See Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 376, 48 Stat. 979, 980.
16 See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 281 (1992) (ThomasJ., dissent-
ing) (arguing that official right extortion at common law was limited to false pre-
tenses); Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government's Authority to
Prosecute Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions
and a Proposal 51 HASTINGs L.J. 699, 706 (2000) (discussing a "shift in the interpreta-
tion of the extortion provisions of the Hobbs Act to encompass official bribery");
Meredith Lee Hager, The Hobbs Act: Maintaining the Distinction Between a Bribe and a
Gift, 83 Ky. L.J. 197, 204 (1995) (arguing that the courts eliminated the need for
coercion from official right extortion); Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local
Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L. J. 1171, 1176
(1977) (arguing that extortion under the Hobbs Act has exceeded its common law
roots); Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REv. 879, 904-08
(2005) (arguing that with (i) an unclear common law distinction between bribery and
extortion; and (ii) highly disproportionate punishments for bribery and extortion,
the Supreme Court should not have read the Hobbs Act to include the passive accept-
ance of bribes by public officials).
17 I define a victim of extortion as someone who pays for no more than fair treat-
ment from a public official. If he pays for better than fair treatment, he is no longer a
victim of extortion but instead should be guilty of bribery. See infra note .
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criminalize blameless conduct in the perpetually gray area of political
contributions. This is because most public corruption statutes punish
public officials who accept payments intended to influence their offi-
cial acts. Although influential political donations are unsettling, if
one accepts the proposition that campaign donations routinely affect
politicians' official acts, the Hobbs Act becomes no longer a law but a
license for unchecked discretion. 19 Too much conduct, regardless of
the parties' intents, can be criminal. This is inconsistent with the
American tradition in criminal law, which discourages strict liability
crimes.20 Yet Justice Thomas's alternative interpretation-limiting
official right extortion to false pretense crimes 21-- lacks both a solid
historical grounding and a majority vote. Even putting that aside, lim-
iting only the Hobbs Act does little to solve the problem. Official
right extortion does not operate in a vacuum. Various statutes now
proscribe official right extortion, thus any solution should be
comprehensive.2 2
This Note will point out the constant parry and thrust between
the Department of Justice and the Supreme Court, and also suggest
solutions for over-criminalization in the federal corruption statutes.
Official right extortion in the Hobbs Act will be the focus: Its history,
its language, and the expansions and retractions in its scope. It will
show that once the Supreme Court curtails a sweeping statute, federal
prosecutors have at their disposal other sections of Title 18, so the
parry and thrust continues. To be clear, extortion should not go
unpunished. It cannot be seen as "just another crime," because it
"destroys democracy, replacing the vote of the people with the vote of
the dollar."23
Part I will examine the roots of extortion. The crime will be
traced from the Hobbs Act to its beginnings in thirteenth century
England. It will show that although the crime in the 1940s contem-
plated private racketeering, extortion at common law chiefly con-
noted governmental corruption. Part II will recount the
18 The phrases "extortion under color of official right" and "official right extor-
tion" will be used interchangeably in this Note.
19 See, e.g., Joseph R. Weeks, Bribes, Gratuities and the Congress: The Institutionalized
Corruption of the Political Process, the Impotence of Criminal Law to Reach It, and a Proposal
for Change, 13J. LEGIS. 123, 123 (1986) ("Virtually every member of Congress has been
compelled to become a crook.").
20 See, e.g., 21 AM.JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 135 (2010) ("Criminal statutes requiring
no mens rea are generally disfavored.").
21 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 281 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
22 See infra Part II.C-E.




federalization of common law extortion in the twentieth century. It
will demonstrate that the Hobbs Act's expansion was not an isolated
incident but instead part of a larger trend by the Justice Department
to target political corruption. Part of the story is how other federal
statutes aimed at political corruption expanded concurrently with the
Hobbs Act. All of the statutes are in danger of losing a critical part of
the crime's common law heritage. This stems from courts reading out
the term "corruptly." Finally, Part III offers solutions aimed at narrow-
ing the reach of the public corruption statutes while still enabling fed-
eral prosecutors to convict corrupt officials. Congress should revise
the criminal code to eliminate the tendency of the public corruption
crimes to have uneven elements and punishments. At the very least,
federal courts should interpret the statutes more narrowly. The sys-
tem can and should do a better job of limiting punishment to those
who act with an evil mind.
I. THE HISTORY OF OFICIAL RIGHT EXTORTION IN THE HOBBs ACT
This Part will support a broad reading of official right extortion
as a matter of history. However, the Note will question the wisdom of
providing prosecutors with such a broad crime, especially considering
the weak reading given to "corruptly"24 in the public corruption
statutes.
Colloquially, extortion does not connote the passive acceptance
of bribes by public officials. We think extortion requires threatening
a victim for private gain--making someone "an offer he can't
refuse." 25 The common law roots of extortion demonstrate otherwise;
the crime encompassed many types of corrupt reciprocities. The
word "corruption" is often used as an umbrella term for extortion,
bribery, fraud, kickbacks, illegal gratuities and racketeering in gen-
eral. Governmental corruption is an improper reciprocity between
private individuals and the State. Different reciprocities between indi-
viduals and the State can be represented by the image of tree rings.
In the middle is the dark core: Extortion. Moving outward, lighter
shades emerge, such as consensual bribery, illegal gratuities, and legit-
imate campaign contributions. So all official right extortions are reci-
procities, yet of course not all reciprocities are criminal.26 The
distinction turns upon what the lawmaker says is a good or bad reci-
24 See infra Part.IIB.
25 THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).
26 In fact, our perception of reciprocity can inform our notion ofjustice. See, e.g.,
Susan Sharpe, The Idea of Reparation, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 24, 24-27
(Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness eds., 2007) ("Keeping our social accounts in
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procity.2 7 To be fair, reciprocities can make for a more efficient gov-
ernment.28 That being said, it has been a centuries-long practice for
Anglo-American societies to prohibit corrupt takings by public offi-
cials for private gain. The usual normative justification for corruption
statutes is that public officials owe their constituents a neutral deci-
sion-making process--individual rights should never be bought or
sold. From the Roman Republic to twentieth century, the prosecution
of tainted officials has been a painful yet indispensable self-cleansing
of the State.29 From the outset, this Note assumes that corruption
statutes, properly used, can achieve good ends for a community. Nev-
relative balance appears to be a basic human drive.. . . [R]eciprocity gives rise not
only to social obligations, but also to our drive for justice.").
27 SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBEs 3 (1984) ("Bribery is an act distinguished from
other reciprocities only if it is socially identified and socially condemned."); Daniel H.
Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784,
786 (1985) ("[B]ribery is the black core of a series of concentric circles representing
the degrees of impropriety in official behavior."). Judge Noonan also argued that
extortion and bribery were mutually exclusive crimes, chiefly because extortion always
required coercion. NOONAN, supra at 398. Yet the Supreme Court and other scholars
have emphatically disagreed with Judge Noonan's distinction. See Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 267-68 (1992) (holding that extortion under color of official
right encompasses passive acceptance of contributions in return for an agreement to
perform specific official acts); James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the
Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695, 1703 (1993) ("Since early com-
mon law, extortion by public officials has included receiving unwarranted pay-
ments-whether by coercion, false pretenses, or bribery.").
28 See, e.g., David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in
White Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1379-81 (2008) ("[G]raft may sometimes
encourage productive economic transactions and prod the government to help entre-
preneurs at critical times in economic development by reducing the uncertainties of
investment.").
29 In 70 B.C., Marcus Tullius Cicero made his mark as an emerging Roman leader
in large part because of his courageous prosecution of the corrupt praetor Gaius Ver-
res ("Hog"). See NOONAN, supra note , at 46-54. The prosecution was particularly
risky for Cicero because he was a candidate for public office, which Hog sought to
sabotage. Some of Hog's more egregious crimes included: (i) For a kickback, waiving
the liability of a man who was responsible for the crooked columns on the Castor and
Pollux temples; (ii) taking money to let a pirate captain escape trial; (iii) taking
money to appoint provincial senators; and (iv) most despicably, crucifying a Roman
citizen. Id. at 46-47. Likewise, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy was faced with
the unenviable case of federal judge Vincent Keogh. Keogh's brother, a congress-
man, had been instrumental in helping to elect John F. Kennedy to the presidency.
Yet persuasive evidence showed that Judge Keogh had accepted a bribe in exchange
for inducing a fellow judge to be lenient on a defendant. President Kennedy
remarked, "My God, I hope that [Robert] doesn't [prosecute Vincent Keogh]. Gene
Keogh was my friend, and, if there's any way I can honestly help him, I'd want to help
him." Vincent Keogh was convicted and sentenced to two years imprisonment. See
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND His TIMES 382-84 (1978).
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ertheless, the scope of the Hobbs Act and its sister statutes must be
constrained if we are to provide our public officials with any guidance
on the lines between proper and improper reciprocities. The rub is
that Congress and the courts cannot decide exactly what constitutes
an improper reciprocity-the tree rings are poorly demarcated. The
courts were correct in the 1970s when they interpreted the Hobbs Act
to proscribe governmental corruption. Yet the Act's modern applica-
tion strays dangerously far from its common law roots. Despite the
growing severity of the punishments, public faith in government is
shrinking.30
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of the phrase "color of official right" is, in
the words of one scholar, "scant."3 Although the Anti-Racketeering
Act of 1934 did not contain the word "extortion," the term as defined
by the Hobbs Act copied language from the 1934 Act.32 That lan-
guage came from New York law.33 When Congress passed the 1934
Act, legislators did not debate the official right language, probably
because they passed it in response to "price fixing and economic coer-
cion extortion by professional gangsters" such as John Dillinger.
34
Indeed, Washington's motivation for the 1934 Act stemmed from vio-
lence and kidnapping. 35 When the House debated the Hobbs Act in
1943, the same focus remained. Legislators discussed official right
extortion briefly: the bill's opponents sought to strike the "official
right" language because they thought it might apply "to an initiation
fee in a labor union."3 6 Representative Hobbs, the bill's sponsor,
30 See, e.g., Michael Johnston, The Elite Culture of Corruption in American Politics, in
ARGENT, POLITIQUE ET CoRRuPTION 49, 49 (Anne Deysine & Donna Kesselman eds.,
1999) ("Many Americans believe corruption runs rampant in political life.").
31 See Ruff, supra note , at 1182.
32 The Hobbs Act defines extortion as: "[T]he obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. §1951(b) (2) (2006). The
relevant language of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 made it criminal to "[obtain]
the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear, or
under color of official right . . . ." Pub. L. No. 376, 48 Stat. 979, 980.
33 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Clarence Hancock) ("The bill
contains definitions of robbery and extortion which follow the definitions contained
in the laws of the State of New York.")
34 H.R. REP. No. 73-1833, at 2 (1934).
35 See, e.g., Joseph B. Keenan, Uncle Sam Presses His New War on Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1933, at XX.
36 89 CONG. REc. 3,228 (1943) (statement of Rep. Stephen Day).
3892011]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
assured legislators that the language was narrow: "[Y] ou pretend to be
a police officer, you pretend to be a deputy sheriff, but you are not."3 7
As it happens, the Hobbs Act might not apply to a citizen posing
as a public official. In United States v. Abbas,38 the Seventh Circuit held
that the crime did not extend to a private citizen masquerading as a
public official. Posing as an FBI agent, Abbas had promised several
immigrants favorable treatment in exchange for cash. In holding that
the Hobbs Act did not reach Abbas's conduct, the Seventh Circuit
specifically addressed Representative Hobbs's statement. The court
wrote that Hobbs's opinion was "completely at odds with the accepted
interpretation of the term [under color of official right] both before
and after the Hobbs Act was enacted."39
Although Representative Hobbs gave an undoubtedly abbreviated
description of official right extortion, he might not have been entirely
wrong. The language in the 1934 Act and the Hobbs Act came from a
proposed penal code for New York known as the Field Code.40 The
Field Code in turn formed the foundation of New York's Penal Code
of 1881.41 The Hobbs Act and the Field Code use nearly identical lan-
guage; the Field Code defines extortion as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or
fear, or under color of official right."4 2 The Penal Code of 1881 elab-
orated on official right extortion under the article "Extortion and
Oppression":
A public officer, or a person pretending to be such, who, unlawfully
and maliciously, under pretense or color of official authority:
1. Arrests another, or detains him against his will; or,
2. Seizes or levies upon another's property; or,
3. Dispossesses another of any lands or tenements; or,
4. Does any other act, whereby another person is injured in his
person, property, or rights;
Commits extortion and is guilty of a misdemeanor.43
In 1909, the article's name changed to "Extortion and Threats"
and the definition's final clause read "[c]ommits oppression and is
37 Id. at 3,229 (statement of Rep. Steve Hobbs).
38 560 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2009).
39 Id. at 663-64 n.3.
40 COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, THE [PROPOSED] PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF
NEWYORK 1865 § 613 AT 220 (1865) (PHOTO. REPRINT 1998) [hereinafter FIELD CODE].
41 SeeJames Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REv. 815, 899-900 (1988).
42 FIELD CODE, supra note 40, § 613 at 220.
43 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 556 (1881) (emphasis added).
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guilty of a misdemeanor."4 4 Professor Lindgren argues that because
the 1881 supplementary definition was listed under the article "Extor-
tion and Oppression," the definition contained a typographical error
and should have read "commits oppression" instead of "commits
extortion."45 He also points out that no other section in the article
mentioned oppression. This would explain the corresponding
change in 1909. Yet the supplementary definition in 1909 was not
listed under "Extortion and Oppression"; it was listed instead under
"Extortion and Threats" with other sections that did contain "threat"
definitions. On that basis, it would be reasonable to conclude that
corruptly impersonating a public official constituted official right
extortion under New York law.
In any event, with both the 1934 Act and the Hobbs Act, Congress
preoccupied itself with coercive--i.e., by violence or fear--extortion.
John Dillinger and Local 807 were the priorities, not corrupt public
officials. As far as the bill's proponents were concerned, as long as the
amended statute reached the payment of wages obtained by violence
or threats, their job was complete. 4 6 Although indeed scant and
ambiguous, the legislative history of official right extortion in the
Hobbs Act is illuminating in two respects. First, it demonstrates that
members of Congress can be careless in drafting their bills. Second, it
reinforces the implication, already evident in the Act's language, that
Congress looked to the Field Code and New York law for its definition
of extortion. 47
B. New York Law
New York adopted most of the Field Code in 1881, and the legis-
lature further defined official right extortion. Section 557 of the 1881
Penal Code provided:
A public officer who asks or receives, or agrees to receive, a fee or
other compensation for his official service, either,
1. In excess of the fee or compensation allowed to him by stat-
ute therefor; or
2. Where no fee or compensation is allowed to him by statute
therefor;
Commits extortion .... .48
44 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 854 (Consol. 1909) (emphasis added).
45 See Lindgren, supra note , at 898.
46 See Lindgren, supra note , at 889-90.
47 See supra note .
48 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 557 (1881) (emphasis added).
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Section 557 merits attention because it indicates that official right
extortion in New York included the acceptance of a bribe by a public
official. In parallel fashion, Section 67 of the same Penal Code
defined bribery by a member of the legislature as: "[A] member of ...
the legislature of this state, who asks, receives, or agrees to receive any
bribe."4 9 Similarly, the current federal bribery statute states:
Whoever ...
(2) being a public official . . . directly or indirectly, corruptly
demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of
value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for:
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act;
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to
collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commis-
sion of any fraud, on the United States; or
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of
the official duty of such official or person . .. [commits bribery] .5
Early New York law offers other clues for the common law under-
standing of extortion. In a note under its definition, the Field Code
pointed to an 1827 case to illustrate the crime.5 1 In People v. Whaley, 52
a justice of the peace postponed the adjournment of a debt because
the plaintiff failed to appear. In private, the defendant later admitted
to the justice that he owed the money.53 The justice ruled in favor of
the plaintiff, and demanded the amount owed as well as three or four
dollars in court costs. The defendant paid the justice the amount
owed plus twelve and one half cents. On these facts a jury convicted
the justice of official right extortion. On appeal, the court first held
that because "the cause had become discontinued by the laches of the
plaintiff," the justice had no jurisdiction and his judgment was void. 5 4
Appealing the extortion conviction, the justice argued that he did not
take the money for personal use.55 The court held that it was unnec-
essary to show that he took the money for personal use.5 6 Instead, it
49 Id. at § 67 (emphasis added). See also FIELD CODE, supra note 40, § 126 at 39
("Every judicial officer of this State who asks, receives, or agrees to receive any bribe upon
any agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion or decision upon any matter
or question which is or may be brought before him for decision shall be thereby
influenced, is punishable by imprisonment...." (emphasis added)).
50 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
51 See FiLD CODE, supra note 40, § 613, at 220 (cmt.).
52 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
53 See id. at 662.
54 Id. at 664.




was "sufficient that he extorted it by color of his office." 57 The court
also emphasized that "the defendant received from Butler, one shil-
ling, by color of his office."5 8
Without additional commentary by the Field Code, Waley's sig-
nificance can only be inferred. The court appeared ambivalent to the
amount extorted and its eventual beneficiary. Put another way, based
on the court's sparse opinion, the extorted money could have been
the amount owed to the plaintiff or the twelve and one half cents. So
Whaley might reinforce the ancient view that extortion is an offense
against the public justice, not an individual.59 In addition, the court
copied Hawkins' definition of extortion. So in another sense the case
could serve as a bridge between the American and the English tradi-
tions. Extortion, as defined by Hawkins and the court, was "any
oppression under color of right. . . . In a stricter sense, it signifies the
taking of money by any officer, by color of his office; either where
none at all is due, or not so much due, or when it is not yet due."60
As discussed above, Congress substantially copied the Field
Code's language in the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 and later in the
Hobbs Act. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Hobbs Act
was based on New York law, and for that reason should be consistent
with common law extortion.6 1 Because Whaley is explicitly mentioned
in the Field Code as an example of official right extortion, it makes
sense to afford it at least some precedential value in interpreting the
Hobbs Act.
Yet the Supreme Court dismissed Whaley's significance nearly 180
years later in Wilkie v. Robbins.6 2 In Wilkie, a ranch-owner brought a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim
against Bureau of Land Management employees for extorting an ease-
ment on his land. The Court dismissed Robbins' claims, in part
because it held that the National Government could not be the
intended beneficiary of an extortionate act.6 3 The Court rejected
57 Id.
58 Id. at 664.
59 See Ruff, supra note , at 1179 (noting that Blackstone categorized extortion as
"an abuse of public justice" (quoting 4 WILUIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141
(1769))).
60 Whaley, 6 Cow. at 663-64 (citing W. HAWIGNs, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 316 (6th ed. 1788))
61 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 264 (1992) (remarking that "the refer-
ence to New York law is consistent with an intent to apply the common-law
definition").
62 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
63 See id. at 564 ("[W]hile Robbins is certainly correct that public officials were
not immune from charges of extortion at common law, . . . the crime of extortion
2011] 393
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Robbins' reliance on Whaley because "the case involved illegally
obtaining property for the benefit of a private third party, [so] it does
not stand for the proposition that an act for the benefit of the Govern-
ment alone can be extortion."6" Yet as discussed earlier, the Whaley
court held that it was unnecessary to prove that the justice extorted
for his own benefit in the form of fees. 65
It remains debatable whether the defendant in an extortion case
must be the beneficiary of a scheme. At common law, the beneficiary
of extortion could be both the State and the public official; the King
received the fee, and the public official took his share. 66 Although the
Supreme Court in Wilkie pointed out that the Hobbs Act had never
been used to punish government employees who extorted for the gov-
ernment's benefit, the Court has not hesitated to recognize other
long-dormant capabilities in the Act's language.6 7  The Supreme
Court might have narrowed the statute's language because it could
expose a large number of government employees to civil claims or
criminal charges.68 In this respect then, the Hobbs Act might not be
in sync with its New York and common law foundations.
C. Common Law Extortion
Before discussing common law extortion, bribery and official
right extortion in the context of public officials should be distin-
guished. At early common law, extortion and bribery were not sepa-
rate offenses because bribery did not become a crime in its own right
until the early seventeenth century.69 The difference between bribery
focused on the harm of public corruption, by the sale of public favors for private gain,
not on the harm caused by overzealous efforts to obtain property on behalf of the
Government." (citations omitted)).
64 Id. at 565.
65 See Whaley, 6 Cow. at 663.
66 SeeJeremy Gayed, Note, "Corruptly": Why Corrupt State of Mind is an Essential
Element for Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1731,
1737 (2003); see also Willett v. Devoy, 170 A.D. 203, 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915) (hold-
ing that in action for extortion where defendant paid the fees into the municipal
treasury, "[n]o distinction is made on the ground that the official keeps the fee
himself").
67 Prosecutors did not take advantage of the Hobbs Act's "official right" language
until the 1970s. See infra Part II.A.
68 See also United States v. Peterson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1371 (M.D. Ga. 2008)
(holding a that sheriff could not be charged with official right extortion under the
Hobbs Act because, after charging inmates for room and board at the jail, he remitted
the funds to the county commissioners).
69 See Lindgren, supra note , at 839 (citing EDMUND COKE, THE THIRD PART OF
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 145-49 (1797)).
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of a public official and official right extortion is that bribery covers
both sides of a reciprocity. Whereas official right extortion reaches
only the public official who receives a bribe, bribery reaches both the
public official and the briber.70
The earliest English extortion statute, the First Statute of West-
minster, consisted of fifty-one chapters, each seeking to address an evil
documented in 1275 A.D. by an appointed commission of King
Edward I.7i The commission recorded the evils in Latin in The Hun-
dred Rolls.7 2 The Articles of Inquest, the record of questions leading to
the Rolls, referred to instances of graft by the King's officers with con-
jugations of the Latin verb "extorquere."73 The First Statute of West-
minster was the King's remedy. In some instances, the extortion
provisions of the Statute proscribed activities that sound to the mod-
ern ear like bribery: "[N]o Sheriff, nor other the King's Officer, take
any Reward to do his Office, but shall be paid of that which they take
of the King; and he that so doth, shall yield twice as much, and shall
be punished at the King's Pleasure."7 4 Other chapters sound like run-
of-the-mill extortion:
And Forasmuch as many complain themselves of Officers, Cry-
ers of Fee, and the Marshals of Justices in Eyre, taking Money wrong-
fully of such as recover Seisin of Land, or of them that obtain their
Suits, and Fines levied, and of Jurors, Towns, Prisoners, and of
others attached upon Pleas of the Crown, otherwise than they ought
to do . . . the King commandeth that such Things be no more done
from henceforth . . .7
70 The Model Penal Code's definition of bribery states: "[P]ayments . . . to
respond to extortionate threats by public officials are within the prohibition." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 240, introductory note for §§ 240.1-240.7 (1980). The Model Penal
Code overlooks an important distinction among bribes, that is, a bribe can be given to
receive either fair or better-than-fair treatment. When the payment is for better-than-
fair treatment, the bribe-giver should be categorized as corrupt. See NOONAN, supra
note 27, at 179 (writing that it is possible without sin "to buy back one's own right
from a judge when one cannot otherwise have it" (quoting THOMAS DE CHOBHAM,
SUMMA CONFESSORUM 518-20 (Revd. F. Broomfield ed., 1968))); Lindgren, supra note
,at 1699.
71 See NOONAN, supra note , at 235.
72 See Lindgren, supra note , at 842.
73 "Extorquere" means "to twist out." Id. at n.127.
74 Statute of Westminster I (1275) ch. 26, 3 Edw. Statutes of the Realms 33
(emphasis added). The word "reward" is often used to describe bribery. Lindgren,
supra note , at 847.
75 Statute of Westminster I (1275) ch. 30, 3 Edw. Statutes of the Realms 34
(emphasis added).
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The gist of early common law extortion was that the rights of citi-
zens could be neither bought nor sold, a notion that can be traced to
the Magna Carta. 76 Extortion cases following the Statute covered all
species of unwarranted takings, from coercive takings and extortion
under false pretenses to the receipt of bribes." The common thread
throughout was that officers of the King committed the crime. For
example, extortion encompassed (i) a deputy to a purveyor of poultry
who extorted chicken-farmers by force (coercive extortion) ;78 (ii) a
bailiff collecting dues from farmers according to an expired custom-
ary fee (false pretenses);79 and (iii) a jail-keeper accepting forty shil-
lings to excuse a prisoner from being branded with a hot iron, "his
legal punishment" (bribery).80
Early treatise writers' definitions were consistent with the ancient
understanding of extortion. Edward Coke wrote:
[Extortion] is a great misprision, by wresting or unlawfully taking by
any officer, by colour of his office, any money or valuable thing of
or from any man, either that is not due, or more than is due, or
before it be due.81
William Hawkins wrote:
[E]xtortion in a large sense signifies any oppression under colour of
right; but that in a strict sense, it signifies the taking of money by
any officer, by colour of his office, either where none at all is due, or
not so much is due, or where it is not yet due.82
Blackstone defined extortion as "an abuse of public, justice which
consists in an officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from
any man, any money or thing of value, that is not due him, or more
than is due, or before it is due."83 At its core, extortion at early com-
76 See MAGNA CARTA, June 15, 1215, ch. 40, at 327 (J. Holt ed. 1965) ("To no one
will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice.").
77 For a comprehensive history of the varieties of early common law extortion, see
Lindgren, supra note , at 848-57.
78 See id. at 851 (citing CALENDAR OF ASSIZE RECORDs: HERTFORDSHIRE INDICT-
MENTs, ELIZABETH 1, at 64, no. 400 (J. Cockburn ed. 1975) (Sharpe (1586)).
79 See id. (citing Rous v. Jocelyn, EYRE OF LONDON, 1319, 26 YEAR BOOKS OF
EDWARD II, 1321, at 263-66) (Helen M. Cam ed. 1969).
80 See id. at 854 (citing CALENDAR OF ASsIZE REcORDs: KENT INDICTMENTS, ELIZA-
BETH I, at 101, no. 568 (J. Cockburn ed. 1979) (Johnson 1571)).
81 EDWARD CoKE, 3 LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 145 (J.
Thomas ed. 1826). Interestingly, comment (P) states that " [n] either is it criminal for
an officer to take a reward voluntarily offered him for the more diligent or expedi-
tious performance of his duty." Id. However, "a promise to pay him money for any
act of duty which the law does not suffer him to receive, is absolutely void." Id.
82 HAWKINS, supra note , at 316.
83 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 141.
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mon law concerned itself with unwarranted takings by public offi-
cials.84 The federal definition of extortion in the Hobbs Act covers
even more.
The Hobbs Act includes extortion by public officials ("under
color of official right") as well as all private extortion ("by wrongful
use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear").*85 The Supreme
Court has observed that this is a marked enlargement of common law
extortion,'8 6 because official right extortion was the only kind of extor-
tion at common law. Therefore, the definition of extortion in the
Field Code and subsequent New York law was indeed faithful to the
concept of common law extortion because it included all forms of offi-
cial right extortion. It differed from common law extortion because it
enlarged the crime's scope to include violent and threatening con-
duct by private citizens and groups. When the crime became federal-
ized in the late twentieth century, it continued to grow.
II. THE FEDERALIZATION OF COMMON LAW EXTORTION
A. Dormant Language
Beginning with United States v. Kenny8 7 in 1972, federal prosecu-
tors began using the latent "official right" language of the Hobbs Act
to prosecute corrupt public officials. Since 1949, John Kenny had
been the boss of the Democratic political-machine in Jersey City, New
Jersey.88 Federal prosecutors Frederick Lacey and Herbert J. Stern89
charged Kenny and his henchmen with, among other things, extor-
84 See Lindgren, supra note , at 847 ("[The extortion provisions] were not con-
cerned with whether citizens were coerced by a corrupt official, were paying to pervert
justice in their favor, or were paying after being misled about the proper fee. These
provisions . . . were concerned with whether public officers took unwarranted pay-
ments-nothing more."). However, common law extortion also occasionally pun-
ished private individuals who charged more than a set fee. See HAWKINS, supra note ,
at 317 (noting that a ferryman who charges more than his set fee is guilty of
extortion).
85 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006).
86 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 261 (1992) ("Congress has unquestiona-
bly expanded the common-law definition of extortion to include acts by private individ-
uals pursuant to which property is obtained by means of force, fear, or threats.").
87 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972).
88 Id. at 1210.
89 Before the Third Circuit's decision, Stern wrote an influential law review arti-
cle arguing for a broad reading of official right extortion in the Hobbs Act. See Hon.
Herbert J. Stern, Prosecutions of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnec-
essary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 17 (1971) ("The
distinction between bribery and extortion that has developed under the Hobbs Act is
unnecessary when that Act is used to prosecute corruption in public office.").
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tion under color of official right.9 0 The evidence at trial demon-
strated that contractors with Jersey City paid ten percent of every
contract price to Kenny and his crew, "otherwise they were excluded
from bidding."9 ' Kenny's henchmen were convicted, while his own
trial was severed because of ill health. On appeal the defendants chal-
lenged the trial court's definition of extortion, which read:
The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from
another with his consent induced either by wrongful use of fear or
under color of official right. The term 'fear', as used in the statute,
has the commonly accepted meaning. It is a state of anxious con-
cern, alarm, apprehension of anticipated harm to a business or of a
threatened loss.
Extortion under color of official right is the wrongful taking by
a public officer of money not due him or his office, whether or not
the taking was accomplished by force, threats or use of fear. You
will note that extortion as defined by Federal Law is committed
when property is obtained by consent of the victim by wrongful use
of fear, or when it is obtained under color of official right, and in
either instance the offense of extortion is committed.9 2
The defendants argued that the instruction incorrectly defined
extortion disjunctively, i.e., that extortion could be committed "either
by use of fear or under color of official right."9 3 The Third Circuit
held that, in fact, the Hobbs Act distinguished between extortion by
fear and official right extortion, and affirmed the convictions.94
Kenny cast the Hobbs Act in an entirely new light: The Hobbs Act
and the federal bribery statute merged together. What is more, Kenny
legitimized the federal policing of local corruption.9 5 To be fair, the
push for increased federal prosecution at the local level had been in
motion for over a decade. Attorney General Robert Kennedy vigor-
ously lobbied for expansive anti-racketeering laws to combat organ-
ized crime in the early 1960s.9 6 Still, the Kenny decision stands as a
90 See NOONAN, supra note , at 585.
91 Id.
92 Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229 (citations omitted).
93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 Id. ("The 'under color of official right' language is plainly disjunctive. That
part of the definition repeats the common law definition of extortion, a crime which
could only be committed by a public official, and which did not require proof of
threat, fear, or duress.").
95 See NOONAN, supra note , at 585-86. Until Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482
(1984), the bribery statute was not used to prosecute state and local officials.
96 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 87-966 at 4 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2664,
2666 (letter from Attorney General Kennedy supporting what later come to be known
as the "Travel Act," which criminalized traveling in aid of an unlawful activity); see also
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watershed moment. In the thirty years since the Hobbs Act's enact-
ment, it had never been used to prosecute political corruption. After
Kenny, the Act's reach kept growing.
Take for example the conviction of a former Pennsylvania state
senator in United States v. Mazzei.97 The Third Circuit upheld the con-
viction of Senator Mazzei, who was convicted of official right extortion
under the Hobbs Act. Senator Mazzei had reached an agreement with
the owner of a building in his district: The building owner was eager
to lease unused space in his building, so Mazzei suggested that he
submit a proposal to the State to house the new Bureau of State Lot-
teries. He told the owner "it was the practice on all state leases that a
ten per cent of the gross amount of the rentals would be paid to a
senate finance re-election committee."98 On appeal Mazzei argued
that he had not used the power of his office because "[e]veryone knew
legislators had no leasing authority."99 The .Third Circuit disagreed,
holding that "[a] violation of the statute may be made out by showing
that a public official through the wrongful use of office obtains prop-
erty not due him or his office, even though his acts are not accompa-
nied by the use of 'force, violence or fear."' 100 As long as the victim
reasonably believed that his payment would influence official action
on the part of the public official, the public official committed
extortion. 101
B. Post-Kenny: The Imperfect Federal Revitalization of Extortion
Under Color of Official Right
The Justice Department has done anything but slow down in its
mission to root out corruption. In 1974, the Department successfully
Ruff, supra note , at 1172 n.2 (discussing the legislative results of Attorney General
Kennedy's anti-racketeering campaign). The context of these statutes must be under-
stood to appreciate the intent of their proponents; to prosecute organized crime,
Kennedy needed to expand the Department ofJustice'sjurisdiction. See SCHLESINGER,
supra note , at 264 ("In 1959 the FBI New York office had over four hundred agents
working on communism, four on organized crime."); id. at 268 ("Kennedy was
resolved to force the FBI into action against the mob. If lack ofjurisdiction was Hoo-
ver's alibi, then Kennedy would make FBI jurisdiction explicit; at least this would
weaken the alibi.").
97 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1975).
98 Id. at 641.
99 NOONAN, supra note , at 586.
100 Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 645 (quoting United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875, 878
(7th Cir. 1974)).
101 As Judge Noonan writes, this effectively eliminated any line between bribery
and extortion under color of official right, because "no briber pays unless he thinks it
is necessary to pay." NOONAN, supra note , at 586.
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prosecuted 213 public officials.' 0 2 This number more than doubled
to 440 in 1977.103 In 2009, the Department convicted 1,061 individu-
als for public corruption: 426 federal officials, 102 state officials, 257
local officials, and 276 others involved in public corruption. 0 4 Para-
doxically, public faith in government has not grown with corruption
law. 0 5
To make matters worse, official right extortion's resurrection
under the Hobbs Act was not uniformly faithful to its common law
roots. To be sure, not every divergence from the common law is nec-
essarily a bad thing, such as extortion growing to cover coercive fraud
by private citizens. However, the mens rea required to commit official
right extortion is in danger of extinction, threatening to make it a
strict liability crime. Contrary to the current trend, extortion and
bribery at common law required a corrupt state of mind. 0 6 For a
bribe-giver, a corrupt mind "act[s] with the specific intent to secure
an unlawful advantage or benefit." 07 With this understanding of brib-
ery in mind (i.e., not including a victim paying for fair treatment),108
the mens rea for official right extortion is necessarily the reverse. The
public official must know "that he is not entitled to the payment." 09
As mentioned in Part I, many early extortion cases dealt with public
officials taking more than their set fees. The public officials knew
their fees; it was self-evident that they had an unlawful purpose, and
many cases did not discuss state of mind. 10 The element's absence in
the Hobbs Act should be irrelevant in light of Morissette v. United
States,'' because "extortion" is a term of art with established common
102 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERA-
TIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 1993, at 34 (1993).
103 Id.
104 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERA-
TIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2009, at 51 (2009).
105 See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 30, at 49 ("Many Americans believe corruption
runs rampant in political life.").
106 See Gayed, supra note , at 1740-45.
107 United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sack, J., dissenting).
108 See supra note .
109 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 277 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110 See Gayed, supra note , at 1742 ("[T]he idea of 'state of mind' as it is currently
conceived was not an ascendant concept in the law prior to the nineteenth century.")
(citingJOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 205-06 (4th ed. 2000)); id. at 1742 ("Many
of the cases contain nothing but a bare description of facts and the holding, but all
the cases contain two common elements: (1) a fee was taken, and (2) the taker knew
that the amount was inappropriate.").
111 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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law elements.112 The underlying reason behind the element's disap-
pearance is obscure," 5 but it did not pose a problem until the advent
of prosecutions under the Hobbs Act for bribery after Kenny.
Still, the courts had ample opportunity to incorporate "corruptly"
into official right extortion. Kenny essentially brought parts of 18
U.S.C. § 201 under the umbrella of the Hobbs Act, and § 201(b) (2)
expressly proscribes a public official from "corruptly demand[ing],
seek[ing], receiv[ing], accept[ing], or agree[ing] to receive or accept
anything of value personally or for any other person or entity.""1
4
Courts often illustrated their analyses of the corrupt element in brib-
ery by referring to an exchange as a "quid pro quo." For example, in
United States v. Strand,"15 a summer employee of the U.S. Customs Ser-
vice in the Port of Sumas was convicted of accepting a bribe when an
undercover agent paid him $800.00 to help smuggle a pound of
cocaine into the country. On appeal, the defendant challenged the
trial court's instruction on the requisite intent. The instruction read:
An act is "corruptly" done, if done voluntarily and intention-
ally, and with the bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful
end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or
means.
The motive to act "corruptly" is ordinarily a hope or expecta-
tion of either financial gain or other benefit to one's self, or some
aid or profit or benefit to another.' 16
The district court also emphasized that bribery "'require [d]
proof of specific intent,"' which was defined as "'knowingly [doing]
an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the
law.' "117 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Quid pro quo, of course, was
part of the corrupt intent. Strand had to know that the $800.00 was
consideration for smuggling the cocaine. But, he also had to have a
"bad purpose." As opposed to defining the corrupt intent, quid pro
112 See id. at 263 ("And where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumu-
lated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows
and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body
of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial
mind unless otherwise instructed.").
113 See Gayed, supra note , at 1736 n.20 ("Codifications of the common law that
did not include an express corrupt state of mind element, such as the Field Code, may
have obscured the common law definition of color of right extortion.").
114 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
115 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978).
116 Id. at 996.
117 Id. (alteration in original).
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quo spoke instead to the transaction's structure, distinguishing it from
an illegal gratuity."i8
Yet in some courts, the existence of a quid pro quo completely
satisfies the corrupt element in charges of bribery and, by extension,
official right extortion. In United States v. Alfisi,119 prosecutors alleged
that wholesalers of produce routinely bribed United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) inspectors in exchange for the inspec-
tors downgrading their assessments of the produce, thus "allow[ing]
the wholesalers to renegotiate downward the price of a load of pro-
duce" with the farmers. 120 Alfisi, a wholesaler, maintained that
"USDA officials at the market were operating an extortion scheme
and that [he] was coerced into paying [an inspector] solely to ensure
that [the inspector] would do his job properly."' 2 ' Alfisi was con-
victed of bribery under § 201. On appeal, he argued that he did not
make the payment with a corrupt intent, that is, to "procure a viola-
tion of the public official's duty."12 2 The Second Circuit, over a dis-
sent by Judge Sack, held that evidence of a quid pro quo showed
intent "to influence any official act," and satisfied the term "corruptly"
in the statute.123 The majority cited Justice Scalia's opinion in United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California,124 which held that "for brib-
ery there must be a quid pro quo-a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act."' 2 5 Finally, the
majority argued, it was sound policy to risk "a danger of overinclusion
in a broad definition,"126 especially when the extorted individual
should report the coercion to authorities.12 7
118 See id. at 995 ("It is this element of quid pro quo that distinguishes the height-
ened criminal intent requisite under the bribery sections of the statute from the sim-
ple mens rea required for violation of the gratuity sections."). Whether a distinction
exists between bribery and illegal gratuities remains unclear. The difference would
turn upon the difference between a "quid pro quo" and a "link." Cf George D.
Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us--Salinas, Sun-Diamond, and Two Views of the
Anticorruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747, 774 (2000) ("The Court has essentially elimi-
nated the separate crime of unlawful gratuity and turned it into a lesser included
offense of bribery.").
119 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002).
120 Id. at 148.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 150.
123 Id. at 151.
124 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
125 Id. at 404-05.
126 Alfisi, 308 F.3d-at 151.
127 Id. at 150 n.1 (opining that "'[t]he proper response to coercion by corrupt
public officials should be to go to the authorities, not to make the payoff'" (quoting
United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1973))); see also United States v.
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In dissent, Judge Sack argued that the majority had read the term
"corruptly" out of the bribery statute. He began with the Act's lan-
guage: the bribery statute prohibits "corruptly giving, offering, or
promis[ing] [somelthing of value to [a] public official . . . with
intent . . . to influence any official act performed or to be per-
formed." 12 8 As Justice Scalia explained in Sun-Diamond, quid pro quo
speaks to the "'influence any official act"' language in the statute.1
29
If that clause spoke to the requisite intent to commit bribery, then the
term "corruptly" would be superfluous language. And as Judge Sack
pointed out, "it is a 'well-settled rule of statutory construction that all
parts of a statute, if at all possible, are to be given effect."'
130 The
term "corruptly" should have been given a separate meaning, i.e., that
to act corruptly is "'to act with the specific intent to secure an unlaw-
ful advantage or benefit."'n1 Not only would this reading have been
consistent with common law, it would also limit the statute's reach to
defendants who acted with an evil mind.
Contrast the result in Alfisi with the First Circuit's holding in
Roma Construction Co. v. aRusso.13 2 In Roma the plaintiffs entered into
a real-estate development with the DePetrillos, who had indepen-
dently reached an agreement with Mayor aRusso of Johnston, Rhode
Island. Per the agreement, the DePetrillos made payments to aRusso
to receive approvals for the development. After the DePetrillos exited
the venture, aRusso informed the plaintiffs of his agreement with the
DePetrillos and warned them that the "project was 'dead"'"33 unless
they made payments. The plaintiffs continued the scheme until their
investment was safe and reported the plot to the FBI. Then, they
West, 746 F. Supp. 2d 932 (N.D. 111. 2010) (holding that victims of extortion can still
be guilty of bribery).
128 Alfisi, 308 F.3d at 154 (Sack, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
129 Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404. Sun-Diamond did not explicitly hold that evi-
dence of a quid pro quo satisfies the "corruptly" element of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b).
Instead, Sun-Diamond addressed the differences between §§ 201(b) and 201(c) of
Title 18. Section 201(b) prohibits giving something with the "intent to influence any
official act," whereas § 201(c) prohibits giving something "for or because of any offi-
cial act." Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the "intent to influence"
language connotes a quid pro quo, while "for or because of any official act" requires
only a "link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific
'official act.'" Id. at 414. It remains within the realm of possibility that the Supreme
Court could give teeth to the term "corruptly" in § 201(b).
130 Alfisi, 308 F.3d at 156 (Sack, J., dissenting) (quoting Weinberger v. Hyason,
Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633 (1973)).
131 Id. at 155 (quoting Appellant's Letter to the District Court at 2, United States v.
Afisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002)).
132 96 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 1996).
133 Id. at 568.
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brought civil racketeering charges. The district court dismissed the
charges "on the grounds that the plaintiffs' own conduct rendered
them unable to maintain standing to press their claims."' 34 The dis-
trict court reasoned that the plaintiffs had participated in bribery
according to the Model Penal Code, which does not distinguish
between victims of extortionate schemes and corrupt bribe-givers.13 5
The First Circuit rejected the Model Penal Code's policy, however,
favoring an approach consistent with the common law understanding
of "corruptly." Rhode Island's bribery statute, like 18 U.S.C. § 201(b),
required a bribe to be "corruptly" given.13 6 The court held that to
give a bribe corruptly, the bribe-giver must intend to "obtain ill-gotten
gain."13 7 Because the facts indicated that the plaintiffs could have
been "the innocent victims of a criminal enterprise,"138 the First Cir-
cuit reversed the district court. Roma demonstrates that evidence of a
quid pro quo is a necessary but not sufficient element of official right
extortion. A corrupt intent should also be required, not only for brib-
ery but any public corruption crime. Otherwise, an extortion victim
or a blameless public official could be swept within bribery or extor-
tion's reach. An overinclusive statute might catch more wrongdoers,
but American criminal jurisprudence is premised on the "fundamen-
tal value determination" that "it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free."139 With that in mind, the "cor-
ruptly" element serves a significant purpose-a purpose for which
"quid pro quo" is inadequate.
Like bribery, federal law also requires evidence of a quid pro quo
in official right extortion. The doctrine emerged from the Supreme
Court's decision in McCormick v. United States.140 Robert L. McCor-
mick, a member of the West Virginia House of Delegates, was indicted
and convicted on five counts of extorting under color of official right
in violation of the Hobbs Act. McCormick avidly supported a legisla-
tive program in his state whereby foreign-educated doctors were
allowed to practice medicine in West Virginia while studying for the
state licensing exams. At the same time, he received several thousand
134 Id.
135 See id. at 573. See supra note for a discussion of the Model Penal Code's
stance on bribery.
136 See id. at 573 (distinguishing Rhode Island law from the Model Penal Code).
137 Id. at 574.
138 Id.
139 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 442
(1986) ("There is no worse injustice than wrongly to strip a man of his dignity.").
140 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
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dollars in donations from foreign doctors. The bill passed. Two
weeks later, he received another payment from the doctors.141 The
jury convicted McCormick after the trial judge instructed them that
the "payment ... influence [d] [his] official conduct, and with knowl-
edge on the part of Mr. McCormick that they were paid to him with
that expectation by virtue of the office he held."142 It does not strain
the imagination to recognize that this description of extortion would
apply to a substantial number of campaign contributions viewed post-
hoc. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the reasoning that official right
extortion did not require proof of a quid pro quo.14 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the appro-
priate relationship between a payment and an official action. Writing
for the majority, Justice White held that anything less than explicit
proof of a quid pro quo
would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been
thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real
sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by
private contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the
beginning of the Nation.144
Without elaborating on what satisfied the standard, the Court
held that the facts of the case were insufficient to show extortion. Jus-
tice White's opinion is interesting in that it is "neither textual nor
historical."145 Instead, it is an entirely policy-based interpretation of
the Hobbs Act. Read between the lines, it demonstrates the tension
between the Court and the Department of Justice.146 Whatever the
shortcomings of the American campaign system, the lower court's
broad reading of the Hobbs Act would have been untenable. Extor-
tion required explicit quid pro quos.147
Quid pro quo is important for Hobbs Act prosecutions because it
serves as a weak buffer between innocent and criminal conduct. Quid
141 Id. at 257.
142 Id. at 265.
143 Id. at 266.
144 Id. at 272.
145 Lindgren, supra note , at 1709.
146 Michael W. Carey, the United States Attorney for West Virginia, painted a grim
picture for West Virginians about their so-called ethics crisis: "The whole thing is start-
ing to crumble, and we're going to see a stronger state government." B. Drummond
Ayres, Jr., Corruption Cases Leave State in Search of Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1989, at
A14.
147 See United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 937 (9th Cir. 2009) (not-
ing that, although McCormick spoke only to campaign contributions, almost every cir-
cuit requires a quid pro quo for extortion under color of official right).
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pro quo falls short as an effective standard because a prosecutor can
easily paint ordinary political business as a nefarious quid pro quo.14 8
As long as a prosecutor can muster evidence of a quid pro quo, a
public official may be guilty of extortion under color of official right,
and a private party may be guilty of bribery. If the term "corruptly"
simply means "quid pro quo," then the scope of the Hobbs Act,
already quite large if otherwise read faithfully to the common law,
could create a "federal leviathan." 1 4 9 An alternative reading of the
term corruptly would alleviate this problem, because quid pro quos
are not necessarily corrupt.15 0 Although Justice White used the term
"explicit" in his opinion, most courts have held that the quid pro quo
need not be stated in express terms, "for otherwise the law's effects
could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods."15 ' Put another way,
the McCormick standard became an illusory protection between inno-
cent and evil intent.
The Supreme Court's next opportunity to address official right
extortion under the Hobbs Act came in Evans v. United States.15 2 John
H. Evans was the Commissioner of DeKalb County, Georgia. In a sting
operation by the FBI, Evans allegedly accepted money to approve a
rezoning request for a real estate developer. The undercover FBI
agent instigated a series of meetings that led to the exchange of
approximately $8000.153 Evans reported some of the money as cam-
148 See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 783 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[I]f read
literally, the [Hobbs Act] could arguably prohibit a public official from personally
soliciting a campaign contribution."); Lowenstein, supra note , at 787 ("[T]he [brib-
ery] statutes as interpreted are susceptible of being applied, and occasionally have
been applied, to situations that occur on an everyday basis in American politics.");
Weeks, supra note , at 126-27 ("What is happening here is precisely what appears to
be happening. In the case of incumbent candidates seeking reelection, money is
being solicited and accepted from PACs and individuals with a particular interest in
the legislation that candidate is or will be considering and voting upon, in exchange
for the officeholder being influenced to favor the donor in the performance of his
duties."); id. at 143 ("If a congressman will not accept the PAC and other special
interest contributions and support their agendas in return, they will find someone
else who will, and this person might well be the congressman's next opponent.").
149 See NOONAN, supra note , at 584 (comparing the Catholic Church's suppression
of simony in the eleventh century to the federal government's assumption of the
responsibility to battle corruption at every level during the twentieth century).
150 It would be naive to assume that politicians are not influenced by contribu-
tions. See Lindgren, supra note , at 1736 ("The problem that the Court is trying to
solve is that elected officials often receive contributions from people with pending
government business.").
151 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
153 Id. at 257-58.
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paign contributions and told the developer: "If you gave me six, I'll do
exactly what I said I was gonna do for you. If you gave me one, I'll do
exactly what I said I was gonna do for you." 154 Evans was convicted of
extortion under color of official right. On appeal, Evans argued that
official right extortion required proof of inducement on the part of
the public official. He based his argument on the Act's language:
"' [E] xtortion' means the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, vio-
lence, or fear, or under color of official right."15 5 Thus, the Court was
tasked with determining whether "induced" applied to the entire
clause or just coercive extortion. Writing for the majority, Justice Ste-
vens held that it applied only to coercive extortion.15 6  Even if
"induced" did apply to official right extortion, it did not mean "that
the transaction must be initiated by the recipient of the bribe."
1 57
Evans' conviction was affirmed. Although a disjunctive reading of the
statute is strained, it is not necessarily at odds with common law extor-
tion to hold that the passive acceptance of bribes constitutes extor-
tion.15 8 The disconnect between common law and modern extortion
still remains, however, because courts are not giving "corruptly" its
due weight.
McCormick and Evans show that members of the Court are grow-
ing uncomfortable with the Act's reach. The Act's legislative history
indicates that it was not meant to be an ethics-in-government statute,
yet the Act reads otherwise. An expansive reading would be appropri-
ate as long as the Act was read with the "corruptly" element. Evans
and McCormick presented the Court with opportunities to limit the
Act's language while remaining faithful to its common law meaning.
In McCormick, the Justice Department pushed for a wide reading to
exempt an explicit quid pro quo from the statute; the Court pushed
back. In Evans, the Justice Department pushed for the elimination of
inducement; the Court relented. The two cases are just the tip of the
154 United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1990), affd, 504 U.S. 255
(1992).
155 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006) (emphasis added).
156 See Evans, 504 U.S. at 265 ("First, we think the word 'induced' is a part of the
definition of the offense by the private individual, but not the offense by the public
official.").
157 Id. at 266.
158 See id. at 273-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (opining that the word "induced"
applies to official right extortion, yet is satisfied by the existence of a quid pro quo);
Lindgren, supra note , at 1716 ("Thus, while I agree with Justice Thomas that the
word 'induced' probably applies to official extortion, I agree with Justice Stevens and
the majority that the word 'induced' adds nothing to the other elements required for
extortion.").
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iceberg. 15 9 The following sub-sections will show that regardless of the
title affixed to the crime, several other statutes cover the same con-
duct as official right extortion. This overlap frustrates uniformity in
the crimes' elements and punishments. In essence, the problem is
systemic.
C. Public Official Salaries
18 U.S.C. § 209(a) states:
Whoever receives any salary, or any contribution to or supple-
mentation of salary, as compensation for his services as an officer or
employee of the executive branch of the United States Govern-
ment, . . . from any source other than the Government of the
United States . . . ; or
Whoever ... makes any contribution to, or in any way supple-
ments, the salary of any such officer or employee under circum-
stances which would make its receipt a violation of this subsection-
Shall be subject to the penalties set forth in section 216 of this
title. 60
The first clause of the statute punishes whoever receives the pay-
ment "for his services," while the second clause punishes the payor
who makes a contribution to the officer "under circumstances" that
would violate the first clause. Section 216 provides that anyone who
"engages in the conduct" may be imprisoned for up to one year, and if
it is done so "willfully" for up to five years.' 6 ' Finally, it allows the
Attorney General to file a civil complaint against violators of § 209.162
In United States v. Project on Government Oversight,'63 the D.C. Circuit
addressed the intent element of the second clause. The case con-
cerned a lump-sum paid by the Project on Government Oversight
(POGO) to Robert A. Berman, a senior economist at the Interior
Department. POGO had engineered an enormous settlement
between the United States and several companies which allegedly
underpaid the government in oil royalties. Berman was instrumental
in POGO's investigation. He had multiple telephone conversations
159 Compare United States v. Manzo, 714 F. Supp. 2d 486, 500 (D.N.J. 2010) (refus-
ing to extend official right extortion under the Hobbs Act to candidate for public
office who never won election), with United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th
Cir. 1976) (holding that an indictment charging conspiracy to commit official right
extortion under the Hobbs Act which began during defendant's candidacy and ended
when he was a genuine public official was proper).
160 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (2006).
161 See 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2006).
162 Id.
163 616 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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with POGO's executive director about the underpayments and helped
draft several Freedom of Information Act requests. The Justice
Department filed civil complaints against POGO and Berman under
18 U.S.C. § 209(a). Ajury found both liable.
At issue on appeal was the level of intent required to find POGO
liable. Both parties agreed that to find Berman liable, the payment
must have been received "'as compensation for his services as an
officer or employee of the executive branch.' 1 64 Berman had to
know that the acts in question were official acts. Yet what did POGO
have to know? The government had to prove either that POGO paid
Berman for actions that turned out to be official acts, or that POGO
"intended [the payment] as compensation for [Berman's] services as
an officer or employee of the United States."' 65 In other words the
court needed to determine whether § 209(a), insofar as it concerned
the payor, was a strict liability crime or not. The distinction was criti-
cal because POGO's defense relied on their belief that Berman's work
was outside the scope of his office. 16 6
Despite the statute's awkward phrasing, the court held that the
statute did indeed carry a mens rea requirement. POGO had to know
that the payments were made for Berman's service as a government
employee. Citing Morissette,167 the court avoided a strict liability read-
ing and rejected the consequences of the Justice Department's read-
ing. For instance, a strict liability reading would criminalize a
"publishing company that pays a Justice Department lawyer to write a
manual on appellate advocacy on his own time . . . if-unbeknownst
to the company-the Department has assigned the employee to write
a similar manual as part of his official duties."16 8 The case demon-
strates the same tensions as McCormick and Evans. While POGO's pay-
ment to Berman might not have been ethically sound, the court was
unwilling to punish POGO at the expense of endangering future
defendants. Section 209 was thus read consistently with the common
law because it required intent to obtain ill-gotten gain. Nevertheless,
Congress has provided federal prosecutors with other opportunities.
164 Id. at 548 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (2006)).
165 See id. (alterations in original) (quoting POGO's Requested Instructions).
166 Id. at 560 ("The heart of the defense was that the defendants did not intend
the payment to be for Berman's government service.").
167 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("[The] mere omission
... of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element. . .
168 Project on Government Oversight, 616 F.3d at 551.
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D. Paved with Good Intentions: The Path to § 666
Section 666 of Title 18 occupies an interesting place in the Justice
Department's arsenal for combating political corruption. The statute
punishes any state, local, or tribal official who:
[E]mbezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without
authority knowingly converts to the use of any person other than
the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies, property that is val-
ued at $5,000 or more, and is owned by, or is under the care, cus-
tody, or control of such organization, government, or agency[,]
or
corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or
accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person,
intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any bus-
iness, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, gov-
ernment, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or
more[.]169
The statute also punishes anyone who:
[C]orruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to
any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organ-
ization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or any
agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or
series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more[] 170
Congress ostensibly designed the statute to "'extend federal brib-
ery prohibitions to bribes offered to state and local officials employed
by agencies receiving federal funds,' thereby filling the regulatory
gaps."1 71 A particularized statute aimed at corrupt state and local offi-
cials would be beneficial, but serious problems arise with § 666. First,
local and state bribery are more than adequately covered by official
right extortion under the Hobbs Act and have been since the
1970s.172 Second, the statute's sweep is "truly stunning." 7 3 The juris-
dictional hook of the statute, receiving $10,000 or more in federal
funds every year, could subject nearly every city and county to the stat-
ute's reach.17 4
169 18 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1) (2006).
170 § 666(a)(2).
171 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (citation omitted) (quoting
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997)).
172 See supra Part II.A.




So far, the Supreme Court has endorsed the statute's sweeping
nature. In Sabri v. United States,1 75 the Court rejected real estate devel-
oper Basim Omar Sabri's argument that his conviction under
§ 666(a) (2) was unconstitutional on its face "because it fails to require
proof of any connection between a bribe or kickback and some fed-
eral money."17 6 The Court found that Congress's Spending Power 7 7
authorized Congress to spend for the general welfare, and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause17 8 authorized Congress to take reasonable
steps to prevent corruption in the benefitted agency. The Court con-
cluded the statute was a reasonable step, and no nexus was required
between the criminal activity and the federal funds. Although requir-
ing a direct connection between the funds and the corruption would
have been difficult, the Court gave the statute enormous latitude.1 79
Courts will continue to flesh out the scope of § 666. It has the
potential to eclipse bribery, mail fraud, and the Hobbs Act because it
contains the elements of each offense, besides embezzlement and out-
right stealing. It stands as a wide-open alternative, ripe for an expan-
sive interpretation whenever the Court limits its sister statutes. Recent
decisions construing the statute give some cause for concern. For
example, some circuits allow § 666 to reach illegal gratuities,180
whereas others would limit it strictly to bribes.' 8 '
E. Honest Services Fraud
Concurrently with the Hobbs Act's expansion in the 1970s, fed-
eral prosecutors began utilizing other dormant language in Title 18 to
prosecute political corruption. Beginning with Shushan v. United
States'82 in 1941, federal prosecutors developed an "intangible rights
doctrine" under the mail and wire fraud statute. The mail fraud stat-
ute, originally enacted in 1872,183 makes it a federal crime to "devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud" using mailing in furtherance of the
scheme.'8 4 Congress amended the statute in 1909 to read "any
175 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
176 Id. at 604.
177 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
178 Id. cl. 18.
179 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 613 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("No connection whatsoever
between the corrupt transaction and the federal benefits need be shown.").
180 See, e.g., United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1995).
181 See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1015 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998).
182 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941), overruled by United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408
(5th Cir. 1973).
183 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323.
184 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006).
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scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises."' 85 As a general proposition, most prosecutions under the
mail fraud statute contemplated schemes defrauding victims of con-
ventional property such as money. In Shushan, a public official alleg-
edly accepted bribes from businessmen to urge city action favorable to
the bribe-givers. The Fifth Circuit held that a scheme to obtain a
favorable treatment from a public official by the use of bribery "would
not only be a plan to commit the crime of bribery, but would also be a
scheme to defraud the public."1 86
This language was the main source of caselaw for federal prosecu-
tors as they advanced an honest services theory of mail fraud in the
late 1960s. The honest services doctrine differed from traditional
fraud because "[w]hile the offender profited, the betrayed party suf-
fered no deprivation of money or property."1 8 7 In fact, the betrayed
party, if given favorable government treatment, could actually profit
from a fraudulent scheme. 88 One of the bases for this reading of the
mail fraud statute was the disjunctive posture of the statute because of
the "or" in § 1341. Like the Hobbs Act after Kenny, mail fraud swal-
lowed bribery of public officials. Like Representative Hobbs, the mail
fraud statute's architects probably did not envision such breadth. In
contrast with official right extortion under the Hobbs Act, the intangi-
ble rights theory of mail fraud encompassed private fraud.18 9
The Supreme Court checked the intangible rights theory of mail
fraud in McNally v. United States,'90 written by Justice White, also the
author of McCormick. The scheme to defraud in McNally proceeded as
follows: Kentucky elected a Democratic governor, who essentially gave
Howard P. "Sonny" Hunt, chairman of the state's Democratic Party,
control over selecting insurance agencies for the State. Hunt chose
the Wombwell Insurance Company of Lexington in consideration for
Wombwell sharing commissions with other insurance agencies
selected by Hunt. The recipient agencies included Seton Investments,
Inc., a company controlled by Hunt, James E. Gray, and Charles J.
McNally. Gray was a former public official, while McNally was a pri-
vate individual. Hunt was convicted of mail and tax fraud. Gray and
McNally were charged with, inter alia, a charge of mail fraud on the
185 Id. (emphasis added); see also Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926
(2010) (tracing the history of § 1341's language).
186 Shushan, 117 F.2d at 115.
187 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 2926-27.
190 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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basis that they "had devised a scheme. .. to defraud the citizens and
government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth's
affairs conducted honestly."19' A jury found them guilty, and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed. Tracing mail fraud's development from its
roots in the 1800s, the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that
the mail fraud statute as passed by Congress protected only traditional
property rights and did not contemplate the body-politic's right to
honest and impartial governmental services. Although not stated by
the Court, it is implicit in the opinion that the statute's language had
been pushed too far in becoming an ethics-in-government act. Even
Justice Stevens in dissent admitted "there may have been some overly
expansive applications of section 1341 in the past."192
Similar to its reaction after Local 807, Congress amended the mail
and wire fraud statutes to counteract the Supreme Court's decision in
McNally. In 1988, an addition was added to the Omnibus Drug Bill 193
that restored mail fraud's reach to the deprivation of honest services,
later codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1346.194 The honest-services statute
states: "For the purposes of th [e] chapter [of the United States Code
that prohibits, inter alia, mail fraud, § 1341, and wire fraud, § 1343],
the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."195
Though it took over twenty years, the Supreme Court returned the
favor in 2010 with its decision in Skilling v. United States.'96
In Skilling, a former top-ranking executive of the Enron Corpora-
tion was charged with, among other things, wire fraud on the basis
that he deprived Enron's shareholders the intangible right of his hon-
est services by propping up Enron's financial stability before it went
bankrupt.197 At issue on appeal was whether § 1346 was unconstitu-
tionally vague. To avoid vagueness, a criminal statute must "define
the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary peo-
ple can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment."1'* While not throwing out the entirety of § 1346 on the basis
191 Id. at 353.
192 Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see alsoJulie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Crimi-
nal "Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
643, 663 (2006) (criticizing the pre-Skilling "draconian" reach of § 1346).
193 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508.
194 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
195 Id.
196 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
197 See id. at 2908.
198 Id. at 2927-28 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
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of vagueness, the Court pared down the statute to reach only bribes
and kickbacks.199 Because the reach of the honest services doctrine
was in "disarray," the Court limited the statute's construction to pre-
serve its constitutionality.200 Still, the honest services doctrine can
reach beyond public official bribery to private conduct.20 Skilling is
positive in the sense that it makes the crime of honest services fraud
more well-defined. Still, the problems of breadth inherent in the
bribery statute and the Hobbs Act remain with honest services fraud.
In this sense, it is as powerful as the Hobbs Act, especially because in
2002 Congress extended the maximum prison sentence for honest
services fraud from five to twenty years.202
It might be helpful to put this is in perspective. In contrast to the
twenty-year maximums for honest services fraud and official right
extortion, violators of the bribery statute face up to fifteen years of
imprisonment. Violators of § 666 face imprisonment of up to ten
years. Finally, violators of the illegal gratuities statute face imprison-
ment of no more than two years. Troublingly, the same conduct
could be described as quid pro quo (bribery or extortion), linked to
an official act (illegal gratuity), or a scheme to defraud the public of
honest services. Arguably, the same conduct should receive a uniform
punishment in federal courts, 203 yet the maximum sentences range
from two to twenty years.204 The reality of this statutory overlap is that
the prosecutor becomes a one-man legislator by defining the crime
while Congress shirks its duty to make the law. Prosecutorial discre-
199 Id. at 2931.
200 Id. at 2929.
201 See id. at 2931 n.42 (listing examples of bribery and kickback schemes with
employee-employer and union official-union member relationships).
202 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IX, § 903(a), 116 Stat.
805 (2002) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006)).
203 For a discussion of the dangers of overlapping federal crimes with dispropor-
tionate punishment, see generally Smith, supra note .
204 Granted, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines aim to coordinate the incarceration
periods for bribery, official right extortion, and honest services fraud. For example, a
public official who received a $6000 bribe and was a first-time offender would face
between thirty-three and forty-one months in prison. It would not matter whether he
was convicted of bribery, official right extortion, or honest services fraud. These cal-
culations also assume that the bribe was not in the furtherance of another crime,
which would ratchet up the sentence. If, on the other hand, he were convicted for
the receipt of an illegal gratuity, he could not face more than twenty-four months in
prison, no matter the circumstances. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2C1.1 (2010). In addition, because the Guidelines are only advisory, it is well within
a federal judge's prerogative to abide only by the statutory maximums. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 345 (2005).
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tion of this nature does not bode well for a country that claims to be
"a government of laws and not of men."205
The case of United States v. Siegelman206 illustrates many of the
problems in the federal corruption statutes. On June 29, 2006, a jury
in Alabama convicted former governor Don Siegelman on charges of
bribery, honest services mail fraud, and obstruction of justice. The
bribery charges stemmed from the relationship between Siegelman
and Richard Scrushy, the former CEO of HealthSouth. Siegelman was
elected governor in 1998 on a campaign platform advocating a state-
lottery to fund education. To this end, he established the Alabama
Education Lottery Foundation after his victory. Acquaintances of Sie-
gelman and Scrushy testified that Scrushy believed he needed to con-
tribute to the Foundation to obtain a seat on the Certificate of Need
Review Board ("CON Board"). A seat was attractive to Scrushy
because the Board determines whether a healthcare provider can
open a new facility in Alabama. Eventually, Scrushy directed nearly
$500,000 to the Foundation and Siegelman appointed him to the
Board. On appeal, Siegelman argued that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the jury's finding of a quid pro quo. The central
piece of the prosecution's case was a conversation between Siegelman
and Nick Bailey after Scrushy dropped off a check for $250,000:
Bailey testified that after Scrushy left, Siegelman showed
[Scrushy's] check to Bailey and told him that Scrushy was "halfway
there." Bailey asked, "what in the world is [Scrushy] going to want for
that?" Siegelman replied, "the CON Board." Bailey then asked, "I
wouldn't think that would be a problem, would it?" Siegelman
responded, "I wouldn't think so." 207
Siegelman argued on appeal that this conversation fell far short
of McCormick's explicit quid pro quo standard. 208 The Court rejected
Siegelman's argument, and the implications are troubling. The more
broadly a court reads the quid pro quo standard, the more endan-
gered the political process becomes. The disconcerting reality is that
politicians must solicit funds to further agendas. Not surprisingly,
political appointees are routinely heavy donators. Scrushy's qualifica-
205 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (quoting
MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. I, art. XXX (1780)); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men.").
206 561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009) vacated, 130 S.Ct. 3542 (2010).
207 Id. at 1221.
208 Although McConnich addressed the Hobbs Act and the Alabama jury convicted
Siegelman of bribery under § 666, the two statutes utilize the federal definition of
bribery found in § 201.
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tions were not at issue: He had served on the CON Board under three
previous Alabama governors.
The holding in Siegelman is also in tension with Wilkie.209 Wilkie
held that a public official is incapable of committing official right
extortion when the intended beneficiary is the federal government.
Likewise, the bribery charges against Siegelman did not allege that
Siegelman accepted Scrushy's donations for personal use. Instead,
the donations were directed towards a lottery fundraiser. 210 Neverthe-
less, the jury convicted Siegelman on charges of bribery, even though
the intended beneficiary was the state of Alabama.
Even if Governor Siegelman did not become a target by virtue of
party affiliation, the unchecked prosecution of high-profile public
figures provides a host of unhealthy incentives. 211 The political cir-
cumstances of the case were "extraordinary."212 After the governor's
conviction, a bipartisan group of fifty-two state attorneys general
raised ethical concerns about the prosecution. 213 For instance, the
United States Attorney for Montgomery, Alabama, Leura G. Canary,
recused herself from the prosecution because her husband "was Ala-
bama's top Republican operative who had worked closely with [Karl]
Rove for years."214 However, documents released by a Department of
Justice staffworker indicated that Canary continued to offer the prose-
209 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
210 Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 on Counts Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, & Nine-The § 371,
§ 666(a) (1) (B), & Honest Services Charges at 31, United States v. Siegelman, No.
2:05-cr-119-MEF (M.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2006).
211 See, e.g., George D. Brown, New Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who Should
Prosecute State and Local Officials for Political Corruption?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 417,
441 (2003) (noting that corruption cases in Chicago during the 1970s "had increased
the stature of prosecutors"); Matthew N. Brown, Prosecutorial Discretion and Federal Mail
Fraud Prosecutions for Honest Services Fraud, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 667, 668 (2008)
(arguing that, pre-Skilling, the honest services doctrine encouraged abuse by prosecu-
tors); Ralph E. Loomis, Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected State Officials for Mail
Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront to Federalism?, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 63, 78-79
(1978) ("The dangers of this activist approach are twofold: it legitimatizes the United
States Attorney as a political actor and advocates a broad unchecked use of discre-
tion."); Abbe David Lowell et al., "Not Every Wrong is a Crime": The Legal and Practical
Problems with the Federal "Honest-Services" Statute, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANc 11, 14 n.16
(2010) (noting that broad discretion in the federal corruption statutes can incentivize
politically expedient prosecutions).
212 Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1219.





cution team legal advice "long after her recusal." 216 In the eyes of
many the governor became a target because he was a Democrat,
216
perhaps from the highest levels of power.2 17
CONCLUSION
Although the Hobbs Act's history indicates that it was not meant
to be an ethics-in-government statute, it did contain common law lan-
guage pregnant with the possibility of prohibiting corruption in gov-
ernment. Besides rules of statutory interpretation and precedent,
social forces coalesced to push the statute towards its modern-day
form. Prosecutors and judges have squeezed and stretched the Act's
language for decades in an attempt to reach a balance between two
legitimate goods: the public's interests in both honest government
and honorable prosecutions. The pendulum has swung too far in one
direction. Part of the problem is that Congress did not legislate care-
fully. Yet even when Congress passed a particularized statute with
§ 666, it cut too wide a swath.218 The blame also lies with overzealous
215 Id.
216 See Adam Zagorin, Selectivejustice in Alabama? TIME (Oct. 4, 2007), http://www.
time.com/time/nation/article/0,
8 5 9 9 ,1668220-3,00.html. ("Several people involved
in the Siegelman case who spoke to TIME say prosecutors were so focused on going
after Siegelman that they showed almost no interest in tracking down what Young said
about apparently illegal contributions to Sessions, Pryor, other well-known figures in
the Alabama G.O.P. and even a few of the state's Democrats. 'Itjust didn't seem like
that was ever going to happen,' said an individual present during key parts of the
investigation. 'Sessions and Pryor were on the home team.'").
217 See, e.g., Adam Zagorin, Rove Linked to Alabama Case, TIME (Oct. 10, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1
66 9990,00.html.
218 Overcriminalization in response to corruption is as old as republican govern-
ment itself. In 63 B.C., under the consulship of Cicero, the Roman Republic passed
an anti-corruption statute that sought to curb the solicitation of votes, or ambitus. See
NOONAN, supra note , at 39-41. Under the statute, ambitus included "payment of men
to greet a candidate or to follow him," reserving seats for voters at public games, and
giving free banquets. Id. Immediately, the impracticability of the law became appar-
ent. The intractable Cato the Younger charged L. Licinius Murena with ambitus after
he lost the next consul election to Murena. Defending Murena, Cicero argued that it
was not ambitus to give favors to friends but instead when the "public was indiscrimi-
nately invited." Moreover, the granting of favors to the electorate was an ancient
tradition for candidates. Ambitus, Cicero argued, was a flexible crime "whose discern-
ment required astute political judgment." Although a faithful reading of the statute
seemed damning to Murena, Cicero's argument prevailed. Purchasing elections was a
habit too far engrained in Roman politics. In short, the statute was pointless.
It could be argued that the German historian Oswald Spengler predicted the
parallels between the influence of money in Cicero's Rome and modem-day Washing-
ton. See generally OswALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST: AN ABRIDGED EDITION
(Helmut Werner & Arthur Helps eds., Charles Francis Atkinson trans., 1932) (1991)
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prosecutors, who sometimes demand public corruption convictions
based on the national mood.219 As Justice Jackson warned, "[t]he
[federal] prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputa-
tion than any other person in America."220
With so many overlapping crimes, differing elements, and dispro-
portionate punishments, the criminal justice system would be well-
served by a criminal code that spoke with clarity and consistency to
public corruption offenses. When the Supreme Court checks one
public corruption statute, prosecutors can turn to others. For exam-
ple, it still remains a question whether a bribery charge under mail or
wire fraud would require proof of a quid pro quo.221 To that end,
synthesizing the public corruption offenses into one statute would
alleviate the confusion engendered when any major decision is made
on any of the corruption statutes. A comprehensive statute would
punish any public official who corruptly demands, seeks, receives, or
agrees to receive property to which he is not entitled. Likewise, fed-
eral law should punish the briber who corruptly offers, gives, or agrees
to give property to a public official. Congress should also explicitly
define "corruptly" as knowledge of fact and law. Finally, the line
between bribery and illegal gratuities is superfluous. Without serious
campaign finance reform, the difference between a payment hoping
to curry influence and a payment actually influencing an official act is
too hazy. What we currently have is not a coherent scheme of offenses
but instead a patchwork of statutes aimed at corrupt public officials,
some by design and others by accident. The same conduct can be
called receipt of an illegal gratuity, bribery, extortion, or honest ser-
vices mail fraud. Even if the punishments were consistent, there
(noting the influence of money in politics). Spengler argued that it was an inevitabil-
ity of history for great cultures to decline as they transitioned into static civilizations.
The transition was marked first by the domination of money in political life, followed
by the rise of an Imperial State and a strong leader. Id. at 378-79. Accordingly,
Cicero's Rome was on the cusp of Caesarism, and we now live in the age of the Impe-
rial Presidency. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
(1973) (paralleling the two phenomena).
219 See, e.g., George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and Local
Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 405 (2005) (discussing the political
nature of public corruption cases); Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM.
INST. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940) ("In times of fear or hysteria political,
racial, religious, social, and economic groups, often from the best of motives, cry for
the scalps of individuals or groups because they do not like their views.").
220 Jackson, supra note 219, at 3 (alteration in original).
221 Cf United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 2009)
(requiring that under the wire fraud statute, when the scheme to defraud involves
paying off a public official, the government must prove evidence of a quid pro quo).
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would remain within the prosecutor's discretion the decision to stig-
matize a defendant with an indictment for extortion as opposed to
receipt of an illegal gratuity. Even an indictment would likely wreck a
public official's reputation and his career.
Admittedly, a generous rewriting of Title 18 threatens to take
years or even decades. In the meantime, federal courts ought to
immediately reinvigorate the term "corruptly." Corruptly should
mean that the public official knows he is receiving a payment to which
he is not entitled. This conception of extortion more closely con-
forms to its roots in common law and serves a much-needed role in
separating innocent from criminal conduct. While they do not explic-
itly contain the word "corruptly," the Hobbs Act, honest services
fraud, § 209 and § 666 have swallowed § 201 and should correspond-
ingly require the same state of mind. Whatever the merits of incen-
tivizing private citizens to report extortionate behavior, victims of
extortion should never be charged with bribery. A victim of extortion,
unlike a true briber, is paying for a fair shake.
Any correction would of course be imperfect. It is in the nature
of a federal system for inconsistencies to appear with "concurrent
jurisdiction" between States and the federal government.
222 Even if
federal courts rejuvenated the corrupt intent element in their inter-
pretation of the federal corruption statutes, the problem of state pred-
icate offenses wrapped up in a Travel Act charge would still remain.
State bribery laws can of course be narrower than their federal coun-
terpart, but in some cases they are more expansive. For example, Cali-
fornia law does not require that a bribe be tied to a specific official
action. 223 Therefore, a charge under the Travel Act could use a state
bribery crime as a predicate offense to circumvent any repairs done to
federal law.
Nevertheless, reform of federal law would spare numerous public
officials and victims of extortion from unwarranted prosecutions and
would also serve as a model to state legislatures and courts. What con-
stitutes an improper reciprocity may differ from culture to culture,
but it should at least be consistent within a culture. Because most
perpetrators of white-collar crime are rational actors, the aggressive
prosecution of corruption has the desired benefit of deterring other
222 See G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Constitu-
tional Theory or New Congressional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive Discre-
tion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1176 (1995).
223 See People v. Gaio, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (remarking
that "[a]ppellants' contention that a bribe must be tied to a specific official action
derives from an entirely different and distinguishable source").
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rational-minded criminals from engaging in similar activities. 2 2 4 Yet
this desire for deterrence should never overwhelm a basic tenet of the
criminal law: limiting punishment to those who act with an evil mind.
224 See John N. Gallo, Effective Law-Enforcement Techniques for Reducing Crime, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1475, 1475-76 (1998).
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